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PUBLIC OPINION AND STRICT SCRUTINY 
EQUAL PROTECTION REVIEW: HIGHER 
EDUCATION AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND 
THE FUTURE OF THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION FRAMEWORK 
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN* 
Abstract: Against the background of the debate over the constitutionality 
of state-sponsored higher education affirmative action programs. this 
Essay presents an account of the modern equal protection framework 
that balances a normative concern for the protection of individuals from 
discrimination and a structural concern for the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty. The author suggests that state-sponsored higher education 
affirmative action programs may survive strict scrutiny, and that proposals 
urging the judicial consideration of public opinion about such programs 
should be rejected. Even if public opinion could be accurately gauged, it 
should not influence the application of strict scrutiny to such programs, 
or play any part in equal protection review. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Orutter v. Bolli7lgel~ 1 the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
state-sponsored higher education affirmative action policies do not 
necessarily violate the Fourteenth Amendment's commitment to equal-
ity. In Grutte/~ the Court applied strict scrutiny to the University of 
Michigan Law School's admissions program, holding that the law 
school had sufficiently demonstrated a compelling interest in attaining 
a diverse student body,2 and that its admissions program was narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest because it did not "insulate" certain indi-
viduals "from competition with all other applicants."3 In addition to 
establishing that state-sponsored higher education affirmative action 
* Assistant Professor of Law. New England School of Law; Visiting Assistant Professor 
of Law. Boston College Law School. Spring 2004. Thanks to Alexandra Deal. Shaun 
Spencer. Chanterelle Sung. Elisabeth Todaro. and Joan 'Vasser for excellent comments 
and suggestions. 
1 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
2 See id. at 2339-42. 
3 Id. at 2342. 
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policies may be constitutional, a principle in some doubt in the years 
since the Court decided Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 4 
Grulter confirmed that the federal courts should apply strict scrutiny 
when faced with equal protection challenges to such policies. 
Though the latter point may now appear unremarkable, a major-
ity of the Court only relatively recently concluded that strict scrutiny 
should be applied to all racial classifications, including those associ-
ated with affirmative action programs.5 And, prior to Grulter, it was 
not at all clear that the Court would find that diversity supplies a 
sufficiently compelling interest to support the kind of preferential 
treatment based upon race that affirmative action necessarily involves, 
or that efforts like the University of Michigan Law School's to limit 
the discriminatory effects of affirmative action would satisfy the nar-
row tailoring necessary for race-based classifications to survive strict 
scrutiny. Indeed, it has long been thought, to quote Gerald Gunther, 
that strict scrutiny in the equal protection context is "strict in theory 
and fatal in fact,"6 and recent judicial applications of strict scrutiny 
have not indicated that the Court, when it reached the issue of higher 
education affirmative action, would regard the matter any differently.7 
Still, after Grulter, questions remain about whether the Court's 
approach to the University of Michigan Law School's policy will be 
relevant in settings other than higher education,S and, more gener-
ally, what limits courts should respect when undertaking strict scrutiny 
equal protection review. In the case of higher education affirmative 
action, Professor Gail Heriot has suggested that courts, in determin-
ing whether policies satisfy strict scrutiny, should take account of ma-
joritarian sentiment toward affirmative action by considering the 
views of the citizenry on the issue, as represented not by their formal 
expression-that is, the positive legal enactment itself, be it by statute, 
ordinance, or regulation-but by raw public opinion, as reflected in 
4438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
5 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen a, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (concluding that 
strict scrutiny is the applicable equal protection standard under the Fifth Amendment for 
reviewing race-based classifications); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
493 (1989) (concluding that strict scrutiny is the applicable equal protection standard 
under the Fourteenth Amendment for reviewing race-based classifications). 
6 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
fora Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1,8 (1972) (internal quotation omitted). 
7 See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227, 237-38 (holding unconstitutional a set-aside pro-
gram designed to benefit minority-run businesses). 
8 See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339 (noting the "special niche" universities occupy in "our 
constitutional tradition"). 
2004] Public Opinion and Equal Prvtection 269 
surveys, polls, and responses to ballot questions.9 She reasons that 
consideration of raw public opllllon is appropriate because 
affirmative action represents a failure of representative democracy in 
respect to a policy that, surveys and polls show, people consistently 
oppose.10 
Professor Heriot made this proposal before the Court decided 
Grutter. Though the Grutter majority did not consider public opinion 
on the issue of affirmative action in higher education in reviewing the 
University of Michigan Law School's admissions program, Heriot's 
proposal warrants examination, if only because it implicitly raises 
anew the question of what factors a court ought to examine when it 
entertains an equal protection challenge to governmental action. 
Heriot's proposal raises this question not just in respect to affirmative 
action, but in any case in which the exercise of judicial review might 
result in the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional law. 
In this Essay, I seek to explore the premises underlying tlle mod-
ern equal protection framework and the goals the framework achieves. 
Given the institutional role for the judiciary that the framework con-
templates, I discuss the reasons why the courts should not in any case 
consider public opinion in determining whether governmental action 
comports with the constitutional commitment to equality. I begin in 
Part I by sketching an account of how courts approach judicial review 
in the equal protection context in view of both a normative concern to 
prevent political majorities from undermining the interests of "discrete 
and insular minorities"ll and the recognition that such a concern could 
lead to judicial overreaching and exacerbate what Alexander Bickel 
termed "the counter-majoritarian difficulty. "12 On this account, state-
sponsored higher education affirmative action programs are not neces-
sarily at odds with the Fourteenth Amendment, even though they con-
tain racial classifications.13 
9 Gail L. Heriot, Strict Scrutiny, Public Opinion, and Affirmative Action on Campus: Should 
the Courts Find a Narrvwly Tailored Solution to a Compellillg Need in a Policy Most Americans Op-
poser, 40 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 217, 218-19 (2003). 
10 See id. at 227 (noting, for example, public opinion polls that suggest that "ninety-
four percent of whites and eighty-six percent of African Americans said hiring, promo-
tions, and college admissions should be based strictly on merit and qualifications other 
than race/ ethnicity" (internal quotation omitted)). 
11 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); see also 
JOHN HART EI,Y, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75-77,148-49,151-53,160-61 (1980). 
12 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). 
13 Cogen t defenses of the need and constitutional justification for affirmative action in 
higher education have been stated elsewhere, and I will not rehearse those arguments 
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Responding to Professor Heriot's specific proposal, Part II ad-
dresses the argument that popular opinion should be a relevant con-
sideration in certain cases involving suspect classifications. I conclude 
that, even assuming it could be accurately measured, popular opinion 
on an issue should be viewed as beyond the scope of the equal protec-
tion inquiry, even in respect to state-sponsored affirmative action, be-
cause it may undermine a court's institutional role in equal protec-
tion cases. Finally, in Part III, I briefly address alternate ways in which 
to apply the equal protection framework so as to allow the courts to 
effectuate their institutional role, while at the same time respecting 
the legitimate limits of their authority in constitutional cases. 
I. THE MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK 
AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
As the Supreme Court itself has observed, "[t]he Fourteenth 
Amendment's promise that no person shall be denied the equal pro-
tection of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that most 
legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with resulting disad-
vantage to various groups or persons."14 In order to implement the 
constitutional commitment to equality without making nearly every 
governmental action a dispute that the courts must ultimately resolve, 
the Court has employed a now-familiar framework: laws that do not 
burden a fundamental interest or target a suspect class of individu-
als-that is, classifications based upon such characteristics as race,IS 
alienage,16 nationality,17 and, lately, sexl8-will be upheld so long as 
the classification "bears a rational relation to some legitimate end. "19 
here. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, What Did Bakke Really Decide?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 
304, 304 (1985); John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 723, 727 (1974); Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Con-
fronting tlie Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 522-25 (2002). My focus in this Essay 
is on the jurisprudential issues provoked by the application of strict scrutiny equal protec-
tion review to affirmative action programs. 
14 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); see also Choquette v. Perrault, 569 A.2d 
455,460 (Vt. 1989) (recognizing that "virtually all regulatory statutes have disparate effects 
on various sectors of the pu blic") . 
15 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
16 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). 
17 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948). 
18 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (concluding that, in respect to 
legislative classifications based upon sex, "the reviewing court must determine whether the 
proffered justification is 'exceedingly persuasive.' The burden of justification is demand-
ing and rests en tirely on the State."). 
19 RomCl; 517 U.S. at 631. 
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Laws that do burden a fundamental interest, however, or single out a 
suspect class for differential treatment, will be subject to strict scru-
tiny, pursuant to which the classification must serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest and be narrowly tailored to promote that inter-
est.20 
The modern equal protection framework reflects a balance be-
tween competing interests. On the one hand is the courts' legitimate 
concern to avoid the tension associated with judicial decision-making 
that is potentially counter-majoritarian. This tension may arise when an 
unelected judiciary exercises its authority to review and, perhaps, in-
validate laws duly enacted by the people's representatives in the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government.21 The counter-majoritarian 
difficulty, in other words, refers to the potentiality that a court, in saying 
what the Constitution requires in relation to a particular law-an act 
that necessarily involves some effort at textual interpretation-and then 
applying that understanding to the facts at hand, may invalidate a ma-
joritarian preference, as formally expressed in the governmental action 
at issue, because it is inconsistent with constitutional principles.22 
On the other hand is the institutional role the courts play in our 
constitutional democracy in respect to the Fourteenth Amendment's 
commitment to equality: the judiciary serves a democracy-reinforcing 
function by, among other things, preventing political majorities from 
using lawmaking processes to discriminate against certain individu-
als. 23 Through equal protection review, the courts can ensure that the 
dignity of those individuals who might be targets for discrimination is 
respected in the same way as that of other, similarly situated individu-
als. For democracy to function optimally, after all, "citizens from all 
20 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying 
strict scrutiny to benign racial classifications). 
21 See BICKEL, supra note 12, at 16--18. 
22 As Professor Barry Friedman has put it: "The problem is thi~: to the extent that de-
mocracy entails responsiveness to popular will, how to explain a branch of government 
whose members are unaccountable to the people, yet have the power to overturn popular 
decisions?" Barry Friedman, Thc History of thc Countcr11taj01itarian Difficttlty, Part Onc: The 
Road to Judicial SuprC11tacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 335 (1998). 
23 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (sug-
gesting that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, 
which tends seriously to cUl'tail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities"). More broadly, the judiciary, "more sheltered than the 
[other branches] from transient political currents and rel[ying], as the framers said, on 
judgment rather than will," is "the institutional custodian of justice." Abram Chayes, How 
Docs the Constitution EstablishJustice7, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1026 (1988). Note that I am 
concerned in this Essay with the modern equal protection approach to assessing legislative 
classifications, and not the fundamental interest strand of equal protection doctrine. 
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walks of life [must] interact freely on terms of equality,"24 and equal 
protection review provides the courts a means to catalyze such inter-
action by invalidating those terms of inequality that serve to exclude 
certain individuals from the larger community. 
The equal protection framework mitigates the potentially counter-
majoritarian effect of equal protection review by cabining its scope. 
The framework assumes that there are bound to be instances in which 
the courts should not defer to the political branches because certain 
individuals, due to characteristics that identity them as members of a 
minority within a community, may suffer at the will of a political major-
ity. The framework recognizes that some governmental classifications 
that emerge from ordinary political processes may reflect accommoda-
tions made at the expense of minority groups; after all, "ins have a way 
of wanting to make sure the outs stay out"25-more so when the outs 
may be defined by such immutable characteristics as their race or sex. 
Accordingly, we reasonably doubt that governmental classifications 
based upon such characteristics resulted from the benign operation of 
ordinary lawmaking, and we are not confident that the individuals 
negatively affected by such classifications could effectively remedy their 
situations through the political process. 
Thus, the equal protection framework serves to focus attention on 
those instances in which we have doubts about the bases for certain 
classifications, causing us to suspect that representative democracy may 
have failed certain individuals in the community.26 The framework 
alerts lawmakers, judges, and lawyers to the particular features of a 
small number of classifications that relate to certain groups of individu-
als. In those cases, the government must show that a compelling inter-
est justifies the discrimination at issue, and that the means to achieve 
that compelling interest are narrowly tailored. 27 But, absent a suspect 
classification-in other words, in the vast majority of cases in the fed-
eral and state courts involving equal protection claims-a court will in-
quire only as to whether there exists a rational basis for the legislative 
classification, and whether the means of achieving that rational end are 
24 Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1195, 1204 (2002). 
25 ELY, supra note 11, at 106. 
26 See City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) ("[TJ he purpose 
of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative 
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool."). 
27 SeeGrutterv. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2337-38 (2003). 
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reasonably related to the classification.28 This is a rather deferential 
standard, under which courts will often presume the validity of the 
classification at issue absent evidence to the contrary.29 
Indeed, the key to the way in which the equal protection frame-
work manages the connter-majoritarian tension is its emphasis on 
significant judicial deference toward governmental classifications in the 
mine run of cases. By focusing judicial attention on the question of 
whether a governmental classification is suspect, the framework func-
tions to alleviate the counter-majoritarian tension by providing that, in 
most cases, the courts will review a governmental classification in a def-
erentiallight. The framework in this way seeks to maximize the reach of 
majoritarian impulses, as expressed through the political process, by 
delineating those very few instances in which a court will not show def-
erence in assessing the constitutionality of a particular classification. 
The equal protection framework accordingly defines the extent to 
which majoritarian impulses can be realized before a court will seri-
ously question the validity of a governmental classification. That 
definition contemplates a broad plane of governmental discretion that 
may, in certain instances, contract, depending upon the circumstances 
of the case and the nature of the discrimination alleged.3o The frame-
work thus legitimizes equal protection review by limiting the cases in 
which judicial deference toward the government's classifications will be 
suspended. In particular, the framework evidences the judiciary's ability 
to control itself by providing for the kind of consistency and predict-
ability in judicial decision-making that allows the courts to fulfill their 
28 In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court-and certain state supreme courts-has 
approached rational basis review with more gusto. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-
36 (1996) (concluding that Colorado constitutional amendment prohibiting laws that 
forbid sexual orientation discrimination was not rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment purpose); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) 
(holding, under state constitution, that restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples had 
no rational basis); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (holding, under state consti-
tution, that exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage bore no reasonable relation to 
the asserted governmental purpose for the exclusion); see also Lawrence Friedman & 
Charles H. Baron, Baker v. State and the Promise of the New Judicial Federalism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 
125, 152-53 (2001). Nonetheless, in the majority of cases in the state and federal courts, 
the traditional conception of minimum rationality review of governmental classifications ap-
plies. 
29 See, e.g., United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (upholding law 
regarding dual retirement benefits on basis of justifications legislature could have found to 
exist). 
30 Cf Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338 (noting that "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-
based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause"). 
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institutional role without anxiety in those instances in which, history 
has shown, their intervention is most needed.31 
Notably, even in those few instances in which the courts suspend 
deference, the governmental classification may still survive equal pro-
tection review. Strict scrutiny need not inevitably be "strict in theory, 
but fatal in fact. "32 Though it may be difficult for the government to 
justify a suspect classification by demonstrating the existence of a com-
pelling interest and narrowly tailored means with which to achieve that 
interest, the Supreme Court has made clear that such interests do, in 
fact, exist, and that narrow tailoring is possible. In the First Amend-
ment context, for example, the Court concluded in BUTson v. Freeman33 
that a state had a compelling interest in protecting the right of its citi-
zens to vote in an election conducted with integrity and reliability, and 
that a restricted, speech-free zone around polling places was narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest.34 The law at issue survived strict scrutiny, 
demonstrating that a compelling interest and the narrowly tailored 
means to achieve that interest are not merely theoretical constructs. 
In light of the concerns underlying the articulation and applica-
tion of the equal protection framework, affirmative action programs 
are not necessarily doomed under strict scrutiny review, even though 
they sanction preferential treatment based upon race. First, such pro-
grams may survive strict scrutiny because, while they establish 
classifications based upon race, they do not fall squarely within the 
central concern of strict scrutiny-namely, the exclusion of minorities 
by the majority in a community. As John Hart Ely noted some thirty 
years ago, "[w]hen the group that controls the decision making proc-
ess classifies so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the 
reasons for being unusually suspicious ... are lacking. "35 And, second, 
affirmative action programs may survive because the government may 
well be able to demonstrate compelling reasons that justifY appropri-
ately tailored affirmative action programs-as the decision in G1'Iltter 
v. Bollinger demonstrates. 36 
3\ See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 78 
(1996) (arguing that the modern equal protection framework promotes "planning and 
predictability for future cases" by enabling individuals to "predict judicial judgmen ts"). 
32 Adm'and, 515 U.S. at 237. 
33504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
34 See id. at 198-99, 208. 
35 Ely, supra note 13, at 735. 
36 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
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II. A MODEST PROPOSAL AND Two RESPONSES 
The understanding of the equal protection framework sketched in 
Part I is premised on the notions that, in view of the counter-major-
itarian difficulty, the courts should in most instances respect the results 
of the political process when entertaining an equal protection chal-
lenge, and that such deference should be suspended only when certain 
suspect governmental classifications are at issue. Professor Heriot, how-
ever, suggests that the case of affirmative action in higher education, 
which involves classification based upon race, is different. She argues 
that, in determining whether this kind of classification survives strict 
scrutiny, courts should show some deference to raw public opinion in 
opposition to higher education affirmative action because public opin-
ion reflects a historically sound suspicion of racial preferences of all 
kinds.37 
As an initial response to Heriot's modest proposal, we might 
query whether it is possible, as a general matter, to ascertain an accu-
rate representation of public opinion. Further, assuming a court 
could identifY and quantifY public opinion, there is still the question 
of whether consideration of public sentiment would upset the balance 
that the equal protection framework strikes between judicial over-
reaching and the judiciary's institutional role in implementing the 
constitutional commitment to equality. I conclude that, from both an 
empirical and a normative standpoint, the courts should not consider 
public opinion in undertaking equal protection review. 
A. The Problem of Identifying and Qy.wntifying Public Opinion 
For purposes of judicial review, the relevant expressions of public 
opinion in our constitutional democracy are the result of the lawmak-
ing apparatus of representative government: statutes, ordinances, and 
other like products of the political process. It is upon such articulations 
of majoritarian sentiment that courts traditionally have relied, for the 
reason, among others, that reliance upon any other source of majori-
tarian sentiment risks opening the door to judicial reevaluation of a 
great many laws that any plaintiff with standing could argue were not 
37 Sec Heriot, supra note 9, at 224, 233 (noting that "the m~ority of Americans appar-
en dy do not believe that racially preferen tial admissions policies are narrowly tailored to fi t 
a compelling interest"). 
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actually supported by a political majority within a given community.38 
That is a recipe for undermining representative democracy, which is 
premised on the notion that elected politicians ought to be primarily 
and directly accountable for decision-making and for laws that are oth-
erwise consistent with federal and state constitutionallimits.39 
Professor Heriot, however, maintains that representative democ-
racy does not work, at least where affirmative action is concerned.40 
And, she suggests that, in respect to higher education affirmative ac-
tion, which involves racial classifications to which, she claims, most 
Americans are opposed, the courts should take account of the alleged 
failures of representative democracy in applying strict scrutiny equal 
protection review. 41 Setting aside the question of whether the claim 
that representative democracy does not work in this instance is accu-
rate or meaningful, Heriot's proposal would create, at a minimum, an 
evidentiary issue-namely, how courts ought to identity and quantify 
public opinion, if not by relying upon the laws that result from the 
political process as indicative of majoritarian sentiment. 
This is the stuff of which protracted litigation is made. Can we say 
that we know with any certainty the public's opinion on a particular 
issue? Is public sentiment accurately reflected, for example, in the 
results of opinion surveys and polls? Heriot cites data showing that 
ninety percent of "whites" oppose affirmative action in hiring and 
promotion as well as in college admissions.42 The accuracy of such 
data may rightly be regarded as questionable. Professor Patricia 
Chang has documented the difficulties of obtaining data about public 
opinion from surveys and polls; as she notes, "survey results are rarely 
presented for public consumption with a reckoning of the response 
38 Cf Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza, 154 F.3d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating 
that the "popularity of [a] challenged measure[]" does not affect the court's analysis of its 
constitutionality) . 
39 See MICHAEL J. PF:RRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 9 
(1982) (explaining that, "[a]s a general matter, a person is accountable to the electorate 
directly if he holds elective office for a designated, temporary period and can remain in 
office beyond that period only by winning reelection"). 
40 See Heriot, supra note 9, at 224 (arguing that "[t]he failures of representational de-
mocracy ... are well known"). 
41 See id. at 233 (reasoning that strict scrutiny "should include a reluctance to approve 
racially discriminatory admissions policies in the face of strong public sentiment against 
them"). 
42 Id. at 226 (citing PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, TilE SCAR OF RACE 130 
(1993». 
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rate-a standard statistic that tells how reliably the results represent 
the target population to which the data is ascribed. "43 
Further, there is authority to suggest that the results of surveys 
and polls may depend on who is doing the asking or the polling, and 
what the participants are being asked. 44 Social science research indi-
cates that the way in which questions are posed and hypothetical 
situations are framed affects the way in which participants assess value 
choices.45 These findings could also undermine the validity of using 
ballot measures, such as initiatives prohibiting affirmative action poli-
cies,46 as a gauge of public opinion, when the very way in which the 
ballot questions are posed may affect the way that voters respond. Of 
course, whether a ballot measure in one state can be said to represent 
the views of the citizens of other states on an issue, or the views of a 
majority of Americans, is, at the very least, debatable. 
B. Public Opinion and Equal Protection Review 
Granted, because the issue of how best to ascertain public senti-
ment on a particular issue is essentially evidentiary, it may not be im-
mune to resolution-perhaps by requiring that public opinion data 
offered in equal protection litigation survive a Daubert-type challenge.47 
Nonetheless, the question remains whether, assuming opinion surveys 
and polls could be crafted to accurately reflect popular understanding 
of an issue and the views of the individuals who participate, courts 
should take that data into consideration when applying strict scrutiny 
in cases involving affirmative action. Professor Heriot contends that 
courts should do so because state-sponsored affirmative action repre-
sents an instance in which "the state bureaucracy favors racial discrimi-
nation while the people do not. "48 She argues that the courts, when 
43 Patricia M.Y. Chang, Survey Says: Recent Polls Tell Us a Lot About Catholics. Or Do Theyr, 
B.C. MAG., Spring 2003, at 61. 
44 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Yams "'elf are, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 
1351 (2001) ("[Olpinion research will often have limited value. The unreliability of poll-
ing information is suggested by the sensitivity of responses to modest changes in the word-
ing of the questions posed and by other factors."). 
45 See id. at 1351 n.946 (summarizing social science research findings). 
46 See Heriot, supra note 9, at 225 (discussing California and Washington initiatives). 
47 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). In Daubert, the Court 
identified four factors to be considered in determining the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence: whether the knowledge can be or has been tested; whether it has been subjected to 
peer review and publication; the known or potential error rate of the technique; and its 
general acceptance. Id. at 592-94. 
48 Heriot, supra note 9, at 225. 
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undertaking equal protection review, should act to correct the failure 
of representative democracy by taking account of majoritarian senti-
ment opposing all racial classifications, including those associated with 
preferential treatment resulting from affirmative action. 49 
Though it may well be true that representative democracy, as cur-
rently configured, is not without its limitations, recognition of that 
fact does not necessarily mean the courts should ever consider popu-
lar opinion, in addition to the government's proffered justification 
for a law, to be relevant when reviewing the law's constitutionality. The 
judiciary is charged in our constitutional system with saying what the 
law is, and that responsibility requires courts to reconcile competing 
arguments about the validity of laws that classifY individuals. Judicial 
reliance upon the government to make a case for the constitutionality 
of a particular classification, such as one that advantages minorities in 
higher education admissions, is, in effect, democracy-reinforcing be-
cause it serves to make transparent the work of the people's represen-
tatives in the political branches of government. That is, it clarifies for 
the community the classifications that the people's representatives 
have formally enacted into law, as well as the justifications that the 
government has put forward in support of those classifications. 
After all, the nature of equal protection review, and especially strict 
scrutiny review, inevitably requires the government to articulate de-
tailed justifications for the classifications con tained in a particular law. 
As well, the reviewing court, in assessing the weight of the proffered 
reason for a classification, must undertake to explain the law and its 
effects. These are requisites of equal protection analysis, which are 
made public through a judicial decision. And, in the written opinion 
that accompanies the judicial decision, the people have a means by 
which to monitor the work of their elected representatives-a means by 
which they can learn, with great precision, of discrepancies between 
what they actually desired and what their repreSenL"ltives enacted into 
law. By relying exclusively upon the government's justifications for a 
law, rather than upon assessments of popular opinion about the law, 
the courts effectively enable the people to hold their representatives 
accountable for misconstruing their interests, should they so desire. 
Nonetheless, critics might argue, the reasons for a classification 
that the government's lawyers put forward in litigation may not repre-
49 See id. at 224-25. Heriot assumes an undifferentiated opposition to all racial prefer-
ences; it may be, though, that certain members of the majority oppose affirmative action 
simply because it is a racial classification that benefits members of minority groups. See id. 
at 225-26. 
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sent the true intent, if any, of the legislature in passing a law or the 
executive in promulgating a particular regulation or policy. 50 While 
many justifications for classifications may be post hoc, at a minimum 
those justifications become operative as a result of an equal protec-
tion challenge to the law. At that point, the court must determine and 
explain what, exactly, the legislature or executive has wrought, and 
the government's lawyers must articulate some justification for why 
the legislature or executive did what it did. That announced 
justification then becomes a benchmark against which the people can 
test the difference between their interests, as expressed to their repre-
sentatives through political action, and the response of their repre-
sentatives-if indeed their representatives responded at all. 
In its opinion in Omtter v. Bollingel; for example, the Supreme 
Court described in great detail the University of Michigan Law 
School's formal affirmative action program-its constituent parts as 
well as its effects.51 The Court also carefully explained the position of 
the state in the litigation, as well as the evidence the state's lawyers 
offered in support of the constitutionality of the university's policy.52 
It is the quality of the state's arguments in favor of affirmative action 
that the Court considered in rendering its judgment on the equal 
protection issue. Importantly, it is also the quality of those arguments, 
and the effects of the affirmative action program that the state sup-
ported, by which the people of Michigan can judge their representa-
tives and hold them accountable for the choices made by the univer-
sity. If, after Orulte1; there are Michigan citizens who do not believe 
that the' university's affirmative action program and the announced 
justifications for that program accurately reflect the policy choices 
they would prefer their representatives-or the bureaucrats for whom 
those representatives are accountable-make, those citizens may seek 
change through the political process. They may band together to urge 
that their representatives pass appropriate laws or replace the bureau-
crats responsible for the policy, or to urge that those representatives 
themselves be replaced in the next electoral cycle. 
50 Pursuant to a public choice theory of lawmaking, for example, "ltlhe legislature is a 
political battlefield; most of its activity is no more purposive than the expedient accommo-
dation of special interest pressures." William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation 
Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PI1T. L. REV. 691, 703 (1987). See 
gellerall~ DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003) (discussing lawmakers as rational 
utility maximizers). 
51 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2331-32 (2003). 
52 See id. at 2333-35. 
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In this way, the decision in Gruller v. Bollinger respects rather than 
undermines the tenets of representative democracy, for it does not 
elide the fundamental importance, in a republic, of the people taking 
responsibility for holding their government accountable for its actions. 
This is not to say that it is in any way a simple matter for citizens who 
feel aggrieved by their representatives' actions to effect change. Profes-
sor Heriot is correct when she notes that those individuals who seek to 
bring about changes in the law through the political process face nu-
merous obstacles, including entrenched incumbents, the power of spe-
cial interests, and general voter apathy. 53 As an equal protection matter, 
however, these problems are not necessarily a court's concern.54 
III. CONCLUSION: THE EQUAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK, REVISITED 
In this Essay I have presented an account of the modern equal 
protection framework that balances a normative concern for the pro-
tection of certain individuals in a community from discrimination, 
with a structural concern for the need to manage the tension to which 
the counter-majoritarian difficulty may lead. I have suggested that 
state-sponsored higher education affirmative action programs may 
survive strict scrutiny, and that consideration of public antipathy to-
ward such programs, even if it could be accurately gauged, ought not 
to influence the application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action 
programs, one way or the other. This does not mean that the ways in 
which the equal protection framework seeks to implement the consti-
tutional commitment to equality cannot be improved. The balance 
that the framework establishes between the judiciary's institutional 
role vis-a.-vis equal protection and the anxiety over the counter-
majoritarian difficulty may still be profitably revisited. 
Such reassessment is occurring in cases brought in state courts, 
raising issues under the equal protection provisions of state constitu-
tions. In Baker v. State 55 and GOodlidge v. Department of Public Health,56 
plaintiffs challenged the respective prohibitions in Vermont and Mas-
sachusetts on same-sex marriage, and the courts of each state took 
53 See Heriot, supra note 9, at 224 n.35. 
54 These problems may be a court's concern when they are directly under considera-
tion in a case, as they were in the recent challenge to federal campaign finance legislation. 
See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003) (challenging 
on First Amendmen t and other constitutional grounds aspects of federal campaign finance 
reform law), a/I'd in part and rcv'd in part, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). 
55744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
56 798 N .E.2d 941 (tvIass. 2003). 
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seriously the principle that non-suspect classifications must have a ra-
tional basis. The courts concluded, essentially, that prohibitions on 
same-sex marriage have no rational basis-at least not on the argu-
ments presented to support the restrictions in each case. But the 
courts also declined to order an immediate judicial remedy-in Baker, 
the court directed the Vermont legislature to devise a means to pro-
vide same-sex couples with the benefits and privileges of marriage,57 
and in Goodridge, the court stayed for six months the effect of its deci-
sion modifying the common-law understanding of marriage to in-
clude same- and opposite-sex couples, in order to give the legislature 
time to take such action as it deemed appropriate.58 
In each case, then, the court exercised more intense review over 
governmental action than the history of rational basis review under 
the equal protection framework would suggest is the norm. At the 
same time, the courts declined to impose judicially-contrived reme-
dies on the people, instead either leaving to the people's representa-
tives the task of crafting an appropriate remedy in view of the per-
ceived constitutional violation, as in the Vermont case,59 or giving the 
legislature time to adjust, and perhaps react, to the ruling, as in the 
Massachusetts case.60 The decisions accordingly distinguish between 
the resolution of a constitutional dispute, which involves the declara-
tion of constitutional obligations, a task that lies within the court's 
competence, and the final articulation of a remedial policy to address 
the constitutional violation, a task that lies within the legislature's 
domain.61 In effect, the courts struck a new balance between the judi-
ciary's institutional role in policing governmental classifications and 
the need to avoid overreaching and the attendant charges of judicial 
activism-a balance that springs from the equal protection frame-
work, to be sure, but one that, at least in respect to rational basis re-
view, pivots on a different jurisprudential axis. 
57 See Baker, 744 A.2d at 886. 
58 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969-70. 
59 SeeVT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1202-1207 (2000) (establishing civil unions in response 
to Baker). 
60 The Massachusetts Senate reacted by proposing a civil union law that would provide 
same-sex couples many of the tangible benefits and protections of marriage. See In re Opin-
ions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass. 2004). The court concluded 
that any law establishing a separate-but-equal civil union regime for same-sex couples 
would be constitutionally infirm. See id. at 572. 
61 See Friedman & Baron, supra note 28, at 151; sec also Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essen-
tialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 870-72 (1999) (discussing the 
rights-remedies distinction in view of respective judicial and legislative roles). 
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Naturally, this kind of equal protection review raises its own ques-
tions. Though the approaches in Baker and Goodridge spurred public 
discourse by referring the issue of remedy to the political process, 
they risked delayed enforcement of constitutional mandates by reluc-
tant legislatures. And, it's unclear whether the more intense rational 
basis review that these approaches endorse will-or should-have any 
application in cases that do not affect such immensely personal mat-
ters as an individual's interest in marrying a person of his or her own 
choosing. At a minimum, though, cases like Baker and Goodlidge sug-
gest that, apart from close adherence to the equal protection frame-
work, there are ways in which courts can implement the constitutional 
commitment to equality that acknowledge both the judiciary's institu-
tional role and an appropriate understanding of how best to effectu-
ate that role in a constitutional democracy. 
